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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Vs. 
ROY HUTCHISON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 17663 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by Amended Information with Forcible 
Sodomy; in that on or about the 18th day of October, 1980, in 
violation of Section 76-5-403, Utah Criminal Code, as amended, the 
Defendant engaged in a sexual act involving the genitals of one 
SCOTT HARRIS and the mouth of the Defendant without the consent of 
said SCOTT HARRIS. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried in the Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County, the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, Judge, on the 19th 
day of January, 1981, the Defendant having waived his rights to a 
jury trial, and said Court found the Defendant guilty as charged. 
Defendant was sentenced by the Court on March 13, 1981, to serve 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1-15 years in the Utah State Prison. Notice of Appeal was filed 
on April 5, 1981. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
judgment of guilty entered in the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State's Complaining Witness, SCOTT HARRIS, a minor, was a 
resident of a Boy's Ranch in Provo Canyon. On October 17, 1980, 
he had just returned from an out-of-town visit with his parents 
and had arrived late that night in the Provo Continental Trailways 
Bus building. (R., at 17) Defendant, ROY HUTCHISON, had spent the 
late evening of October 17, 1980, watching television and drinking 
liquor at his residence. Early in the morning of October 18, 
1980, he walked about half a block to a telephone booth and made a 
phone call. There he met SCOTT HARRIS and invited him to stay the 
night at the Defendant's home. HARRIS admits he knew that the 
Defendant had been drinking heavily. (R., at 25) 
The Defendant and the Complaining Witness spent some time 
drinking liquor and watching television at the Defendant's 
residence, before the Defendant passed out. (R., at 73-75) 
However, witnesses later found SCOTT HARRIS unclothed and huddled 
over a fire made of his own clothes outside. 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SCOTT HARRIS'S further explanation of the incident is 
contained in a report made by the investigating officer of the 
Provo Police Department, ROBERT H. SMITH, October 18, 1980. (R., 
at 46-48) HARRIS indicated that the Defendant had dressed himself 
in women's clothing, and that he had got HARRIS "drunk" and that 
the Defendant had removed HARRIS'S clothing and had attempted to 
have anal intercourse with him. However at trial on January 19, 
1981, HARRIS testified differently. At trial he claimed that 
the Defendant got him drunk, that HARRIS passed out and awoke when 
the Defendant attempted to perform fellatio on him. (R., at 20-22) 
When counsel for the Defendant attempted to have the Police Report 
introduced into evidence to impeach the credibility of the State's 
witness, the trial Court excluded the same on the basis of 
hearsay. (R., at 48-50) Defendant was then convicted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STATEMENTS OF A WITNESS CONTAINED IN A POLICE 
REPORT ARE ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL FOR 
IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES. 
A. In many jurisdictions Police Reports are ad-
missible as substantive evidence under certain 
circumstances. 
Numerous jurisdictions take the view that Police Reports, 
where properly qualified, are themselves admissible as substantive 
-3-
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evidence at Trial without the testimony of the recording Police 
Officer, provided that care is taken to assure the trustworthiness 
of the information contained therein. Johnson vs. State, 253 A.2d 
206 (Del. 1969): State vs. Ing, 497 P.2d 575 (Haw. 1972): ~ 
vs. State, 261 N.E.2d 865 (Ind. 1970): State vs. Taylor, 486 s.w. 
2d 239 (Mo. 1972): State vs. McGeary, 322 A.2d 830 (N.J. 1974); 
People vs. Foster, 261 N.E.2d 389 (N.Y. 1972): Comm. vs. Russell, 
326 A.2d 303 (Penn. 1974): and Gamble vs. State, 383 S.W.2d 48 
(Tenn. 1964). The general rule in such states is that the Courts 
will not allow the admission of anything in the report which would 
not be admissible if testified to by the maker of the report. 
That is, all personal observations made by a reporting officer and 
written in his report are admissible at Trial, although statements 
made to the Officer by third persons are admissible in only 
limited circumstances. 
B. Utah allows the admission of Police Report 
contents at least for impeachment purposes. 
1. The credibility of a witness may be drawn 
into question by his prior inconsistent state-
ments. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-24-1, provides in part: 
(I)n every case the credibility of the witness may be 
drawn into question, by the manner in which he testifies, 
by the character of his testimony, or by evidence effecting 
his charactor for truth, honesty or integrity, or by his 
motives, or by contradictory evidence 
-4-
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Certainly evidence of what the witness has previously stated 
to persons in authority constitutes contradictory evidence which 
will severely effect the credibility of a witness. Likewise Rule 
20, of Utah Rules of Evidence, provides as follows: 
Evidence Generally Affecting Credibility. Subject 
to Rules 21 and 22, for the purpose of impairing or 
supporting the credibility of a witness, any Party 
including the Party calling him may examine him and 
introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any state-
ment or conduct by him and any other matter rel-
event upon the issues of credibility. 
The obvious purpose of Rule 20 is to allow the liberal 
introduction of evidence to impair or support the credibility of a 
witness as the case may be. Whenever any evidence bearing on the 
credibility of a witness can be introduced from another source the 
reliability of a witness's testimony can be more clearly 
ascertained. One of the most frequent objections to the 
introduction of evidence about a witness's prior inconsistant 
statements is that the statement was told to a third party by 
means of an out-of-Court statement, and constitutes heresay. 
Accordingly the first exception that the legislature of this State 
has made as to when heresay evidence may in fact be introduced at 
Trial is contained in Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by 
a witness while testifying at the hearing offered to 
prove the truth of the matter stated is heresay ev-
-5-
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idence and inadmissible at Trial execpt: (1) Prior 
statements of witnesses. A prior statement of a 
witness, if the Judge finds that the witness had an 
adequate opportunity to perceive the event or condition 
which his statement narrates, describes or explains, 
provided that (a) it is inconsistant with his present 
testimony, or (b) it contains otherwise admissible facts 
which the witness denies having stated or has forgotten 
since the making of the statement, or (c) it will sup-
port testimony made by the witness in the present case 
when such testimony has been challenged. (Emphasis added) 
Evidence of a witness's prior inconstant statements, when 
offered to impeach the credibility of the witness and not to prove 
the truth of the matters contained in such statements, are 
admissible under the very first exception to the heresay rule. 
2. A Policeman's Investigative Report made 
within the scope of his duty shortly after 
the occurance of a crime is admissable at 
trial. 
Rule 63 (15), Utah Rules of Evidence provides as follows: 
Reports and findings of Public Officials. Subject to 
Rule 64 and except for traffic accident reports, 
factual data contained in written reports or findings 
of fact made by a Public Official of the United States 
or of a State or territory of the United States, if 
the Judge finds that the making thereof was within the 
scope of the duty of such official and that it was his 
duty (a) to perform the act reported, or (b) to observe 
the act, condition or event reported, or (c) to investi-
gate the facts concerning the act, condition or event 
and to make findings or draw conclusions based upon such 
investigation. 
This Rule clearly contemplates that findings of fact made by 
-6-
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an Officer acting within the scope of his duty as well as his 
conclusions based on his investigation are admissible as evidence 
at Trial under an exception to the Heresay Rule. The Rule 
indicates that the Judge has the discretion to allow the admission 
of such evidence if the information is in written reports or 
findings made by a Public Official within the scope of the duty of 
such Official. Police Reports qualify as admissible evidence 
under this exception except for traffic accident reports, which 
are expressly not admissible. Utah Code Annoted, 1953, Section 
78-25-3, states: 
Entries in public or other official books or records, 
made in the performance of his duty by a Public Officer 
of this State or by any other person in the performance 
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie 
evidence of the facts stated therein. 
Section 78-25-4, provides: 
An entry made by an Officer or Board of Officers, or 
under the direction and in the presence of either, 
in the course of official duty is pr1ma facie evidence 
of the facts stated in such entry. 
If a Police Report is held to be a public record, or if the 
Police Report is made pursuant to his official duty, the facts 
contained in such reports are prima facie evidence. That is, the 
facts stated in such reports could be substantive evidence at 
Trial and are presumed to be true until controverted by better 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
evidence. However in the case at bar the evidence contained in 
the Police Report was not offered as substantive evidence to prove 
the truth of the matters stated therein. The Reports were simply 
offered in a legitimate attempt to impeach the credibility of a 
witness whose testimony at Trial differed in substantial respects 
from the testimony originally given to the Investigating Police 
Officers. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63 (13) provides: 
Business Entries and the Like. Writtings offered as 
memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events to 
prove the facts stated therein, if the Judge finds 
that they were made in the regular course of business 
at or about the time of the act, condition or event 
recorded, and that the sources of information from 
which made and the method and circumstances of their 
preperation were such as to indicate their trust-
worthyness. 
Courts and other jurisdictions, as noted above, have 
routinely allowed the admission of Police Records as substantive 
evidence. The business entries exception is one of the catagories 
under which Courts allow the admission of Police Reports at 
trial. Where the Police Report is prepared pursuant to the 
regular course and proceedure of the Police Department, and was 
taken at or about the time of the act, condition or event 
recorded, and were made under reasonably trustworthy 
circumstances, the contents of said Police Report should be 
-8-
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admissible as an exception to the Hearsay Rule. 
C. The Trial Court abused its discretion in 
excluding the Police Report and Officer's 
testimony regarding the witnesses prior 
inconsistant statements. 
In State vs. Young, 516 P.2d 1398 (Utah 1973) the Supreme 
court of this State upheld the Defendant's conviction for 
Robbery. The Court found that there was no error in admitting the 
prior inconsistant and extrajudicial statements of the Complaining 
Witness about the identification of the accussed. The Complaining 
Witness had earlier told the Police that the Defendant was one of 
those involved in the Robbery, and that the witness had known him 
for about five years. However at a later lineup the Witness 
stated he was unable to identify the Defendant as being present at 
the scene of the crime. The Supreme Court upheld the questioning 
at Trial by the Prosecutor of the Witness as to his extrajudicial 
conversations with the Police Officer under Rules 20 and 63 (1), 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
In the case at bar the Complaining Witness also had prior 
extrajudicial conversations with Police Officers which he later 
contradicted. The Trial Court should have exercised it's 
discretion to allow the impeachment of the credibility of this 
witness, because of this change in testimony. When the State's 
-9-
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complaining Witness, SCOTT HARRIS, made his report to the Police 
Officer on October 18, 1980, he alleged that the Defendant had 
attempted to perform anal intercourse with him, but made no 
mention of any purported incident involving the Defendant's mouth 
and the Complaining Witness's genitals. Conversely at Trial the 
State's Complaining Witness testified that he awoke finding the 
Defendant's mouth upon his genitals. (R., at 31) When counsel for 
the Defense asked the Complaining Witness about his prior state-
ment to the Police Officers regarding the alleged anal 
intercourse, the Witness answered in the affirmative, but his 
answer was so indecisive that the Court did not require the 
Complaining Witness to explain it, (R., at 30). In other words, 
just at the point where the Complaining Witness began showing 
obvious signs of indecisiveness and uncertainty, the Trial Court 
required Defense Counsel to approach the matter from a different 
angle. The exclusion by the Trial Court of the proffered Police 
Report to impeach the credibility of the Complaining Witness was 
improper and prejudiced the Defendant. 
In State vs Sibert, 310 P.2d 388 (Utah 1957), the Supreme 
Court considered a case where the Defendant had been convicted of 
Robbery. The Court ordered a new Trial because the Defendant's 
statement made to a Police Officer shortly after the crime was 
-10-
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admitted at Trial and offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted in such a statement. The Court said: 
The term heresay is applied to testimony offered to 
prove facts which the witness has no personal know-
ledge, but which have been told to him by others. 
He is thus not testifying from his own knowledge or 
observation, but is acting as a conduit to relate 
that of others. The general rule, to which there 
are admittedly many exceptions, is that such testi-
mony is not admissible on the ground that it lacks 
trustworthiness for two basic reasons: (1) The person 
who purports to know the facts is not stating them 
under oath; (2) he is not present for cross-examin-
ation. Other reasons assigned for its unreliability 
are the danger of inaccuracy in the witness relaying 
what he has been told, and the fact that the jury does not 
not have the opportunity to see the person whose declar-
ations are offered as evidence. However it is not every 
instance in which a witness relates what he heard some-
one else say that he is purporting to represent that 
the statement he heard is true. The purpose of his 
testimony may be simply to prove that someone else has 
made a statement without regard to whether it be true or 
false. Testimony of this nature does not violate the 
Hearsay Rule since the witness is asserting under oath 
a fact he personally knows, that is, that the statement 
was made, and he is subject to cross-examination con-
cerning such fact. 310 P.2d at 390-391 (Emphasis added) 
It is true that statements in a Police Report made by a Third 
Party to the reporting Police Officer may not be asserted as 
evidence at trial for the truth of the matters stated by a said 
Third Party. That would be heresay. But the fact that the 
Third Party uttered such a statement is a fact which the recording 
Police Off ier knows first hand, for he has personally heard the 
-11-
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statement. And when that same Third Party is testifying at Trial 
and his testimony differed substantially from his prior extra-
judicial statement, this prior statement is admissible to show the 
variance in the witness's testimony at Trial. In the instant case 
the Complaining Witness made certain statements to the 
Investigating Provo City Police Officer shortly after the alleged 
incident. The statements were duly recorded in a written Police 
Report pursuant to the practices of the Provo City Police 
Department. (R., at 45, 48) Later the State's Complaining Witness 
purported to describe the same events at Trial, but the statements 
at Trial varied significantly from his statements which he made ~ 
the Investigating Police Officer, ROBERT H. SMITH, immediately 
after the alleged crime. Therefore the admission of OFFICER 
SMITH'S report for the limited purpose of impeaching the State's 
witness was proper. OFFICER SMITH was personally present in the 
court room and could be cross-examined by the State. The Trial 
Judge's decision to exclude said report constituted an arbitrary 
exercise of his descretion and artificially allowed the testimony 
of the State's Complaining Witness to stand unimpeached. Because 
the only evidence offered by the State as to the elements of the 
alleged crime was the testimony of SCOTT HARRIS, his credibility 
became of prime importance in determining whether or not any 
-12-
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cornpetant evidence existed upon which the Trial Court could find 
the Defendant guilty. 
In State vs. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980), this Court 
affirmed the Defendant's conviction of Aggravated Sexual Assault 
and Aggravated Burglary. The Court found that the testimony of 
the Policeman relating the statement of the Defendant's girlfriend 
about the Defendant was a legitimate effort to impeach and 
discredit the testimony of the girlfriend at trial. In DeBois vs. 
State, 197 P. 176 (Oak. 1921) the Supreme Court of Oaklahoma 
reversed and remanded for new trial the Defendant's conviction for 
Arson. The State's case rested almost entirely on circumstantial 
evidence buttressed by the testimony of one main witness. The 
Trial Court had sustained the objections on the part of the 
Prosecution to attempts by Defense Counsel to impeach this 
witness's credibility. The Court found that it was competant and 
proper for Defense Counsel to cross-examine the Complaining 
Witness about his prior contradictory or inconsistant statements 
made out of Court. So too, in the case at bar, the statements 
made by the Complaining Witness to the Police Officers immediately 
after the alleged incident varied significantly from his testimony 
at trial. Therefore admission of that Police Report containing 
said statements should have been admitted at Trial for the purpose 
-13-
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of impeaching the Witness's credibility. Utah Courts have 
likewise held that a witness's prior inconsistant statements made 
to a Police Officer may be introduced at Trial to discredit the 
witness's testimony. See State vs. Stockton, 310 P.2d 398 ( Utah 
1957). 
In State vs. Mores, 192 P.2d 861 (Utah 1948) the Supreme 
Court affirmed a conviction of the Defendant for Murder. In that 
case the Defendant had cross-examined the State's medical witness 
and attempted to show that the witness had changed his theory as 
to the course of a bullet that had killed the deceased, between 
the time of the Preliminary Hearing and the time of Trial. The 
Trial Court then permitted the State's witness to read a part of 
his autopsy report in order to show that the witness had not 
changed his theory. This approach is consistant with the Rules 
stated above which allow the introduction of evidence impairing or 
supporting the credibility of a witness. In State vs. Herrera, 
330 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1958) this Court found that the State's 
attempt to impeach the testimony of it's own witness, a physician, 
by intimating that his earlier report was contrary to his oral 
testimony at Trial, without introducing the report into evidence, 
was prejudicial error. In the case at bar the Defense counsel 
sought to impeach the credibility, not of it's own witness, but of 
-14-
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l 
story. So we may recognize this third type of 
allowable contradiction, namely, the contradiction 
of any part of the witness's account of the back-
ground and circumstances of a material trans-
action, which as a matter of human experience he 
would not have been mistaken about if his story 
were true. (Emphasis added) 571 P.2d at 1355; 
citing Davenport vs. State, 519 P.2d 452, 454 
(Alas. 1974) 
Counsel for the Defense at the case at bar attempted at Trial 
to introduce prior extrajudicial statements by the State's 
Complaining Witnss which were inconsistant with his statements at 
Trial. These statements go to the heart of the issue of 
Defendant's guilt, for they were the only evidence which the 
State produced in support of attempting to prove the actual 
elements of the crime. Therefore these issues were not 
collateral, but constituted that heart of the State's case. The 
impeachment of the State's witness on these issues should have 
been allowed because he has given two different accounts of the 
occurances of the crime the Defendant has been charged with, which 
as a matter of human experience, he would not have been mistaken 
about if his story were true. Therefore impeachment of his 
testimony should have been allowed, and exclusion of such evidence 
by the Trial Court constitutes reversible error. 
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the State's main witness, and correctly sought admission into 
evidence of the Police Report containing the prior inconsistant 
statements of said witness. The Trial Court's wrongful exclusion 
of the Police Report for impeachment purposes crippled the 
ability of Defense Counsel to impeach the testimony of the State's 
Complaining Witness. 
In State vs. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977) this Court 
held that the answers of a witness upon cross-examination of any 
irrevelant or collateral matter are conclusive and binding, and 
the witness may not be contradicted or impeached upon any 
immaterial or isolated matter at issue. The Supreme Court 
reversed the Defendant's conviction for Aggravated Robbery because 
the Trial Court had prohibited attempts by the Defense Counsel to 
question the credibility of the testimony of certain of State's 
witnesses, because they were under the influence of narcotics. 
The Court said: 
Suppose a witness has told a story of a transaction 
crucial to the controversy. To prove him wrong in 
some trivial detail of time, place or circumstance 
is "collateral". But to prove untrue some facts 
recited by the witness that if he were really there 
and saw what he claims to have seen, he could not 
have been mistaken about, is a convincing kind of 
impeachment and the Courts must make place for, al-
though the contradiction evidence is otherwise ad-
missible because it is collateral ••. to disprove 
such a fact is to pull out the linchpin of the 
-15-
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF FORCIBLE SODOMY 
A. The Trial Court's exclusion of evidence 
impeaching the credibility of the State's 
only witness prejudicially affected the Def-
endant's substantial rights. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 77-35-30, as amended, Rule 
30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in part: 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall 
be disregarded. 
The exclusion at Trial below of the Police Report containing 
the extrajudicial statements of the State's Complaining Witness, 
which were recorded almost immediately after the disputed 
incident, allowed the testimony of said witness to stand unopposed 
by any other competant evidence. The Defendant himself testified 
at Trial that he had no recollection whatsoever of any of the 
events which the Complaining Witness described. Evidence was 
presented on behalf of the Defense that the Defendant suffered 
from a condition known as Pathalogical Intoxication. (R.,at 55) 
Expert testimony was given that there was an eighty percent (80%) 
chance that the Defendant did not know what he was doing, had no 
memory of what he did, and was not capable of any criminal intent 
-17-
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to perform the acts of which he was accused. (R., at 61) The 
State's Complaining Witness was therefore allowed to describe the 
situation in whatever fashion he chose, without being contradictea 
by the Defendant or anyone else. Counsel for the Defense was 
prohibited from introducing evidence to impeach the testimony of 
the State's Complaining Witness by introducing evidence of prior 
statements by the witness which differed in material respects from 
his statements at Trial. Nor was the Defense allowed to elicit 
testimony from the Investigating Police Officer at Trial as to his 
memory regarding the Complaining Witness's prior statements. 
Since the testimony of the Complaining Witness at Trial was a 
reconstruction of events the witness could admittedly barely 
remember, and consisted of hazy and brief recollections of 
consciousness in between periods of passing out (R., at 20, 22, 
32, 33) it is unreasonable to accord such testimony any great 
evidentiary weight. However since the Defendant himself was 
unconscious and unable to controvert the Complaining Witness's 
testimony, the Court's exclusion of contritictory evidence which 
would impeach the Complaining Witness's testimony artificially 
propped up and supported his account. Weak though such testimony 
may have been, it was the only evidence at all presented by the 
-18-
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State to prove the elements of the crime alleged. Therefore the 
Trial Court rendered a judgment against Defendant. However, had 
the Police Report containing the prior extrajudicial statements of 
the witness been admitted at Trial, even the Trial Court would 
likely have been compelled to acquit the Defendant because of the 
reasonable doubt raised as to the Defendant's guilt. 
part: 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 76-1-501, provides in 
A Defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to 
be innocent until each element of the offense charged 
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
abscence of such proof, the Defendant shall be acquitted. 
The evidence presented at the Trial below was so weak and 
unconvincing as to appear unreasonable and insufficient as a 
matter of law for the Defendant to have been convicted. But this 
is further aggravated by the Trial Court's wrongful exclusion of 
evidence which impeaches the testimony of the State's only witness 
as to the commission of the elements of the alleged crime. In the 
Police Report the State's witness complained that he had little 
recollection of the occurrances at Defendant's residence after 
they began drinking, but the witness alleges Defendant attempted 
to perform anal intercourse with him. No mention was made of any 
alleged sexual act involving the mouth of the Defendant and the 
-19-
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genitals of the Complaining Witness at all. However at Trial the 
State's witness only described an alleged act of oral sex, and 
never directly or indirectly testified as to the Defendant's 
alleged attempt at anal intercourse. In response to Defense 
Counsel's question as to whether or not Defendant attempted anal 
intercourse, the Witness answered "Yes", (R., at 30). However the 
Trial Court could see that the Witness did not understand the 
question to which he had answered in the affirmative. The only 
evidence which the Trial Judge considered was the Witness's 
testimony at Trial. Clearly such testimony would have been weak 
and unsupportable as a matter of law had the Trial Court allowed 
impeachment, such that conviction would be impossible to all 
reasonable minds. 
In State vs. Howard, 544 P.2d 466 (Utah 1975), this Court 
vacated the Defendant's conviction of Rape and remanded the case 
for a new Trial. The evidence established that the association 
between the Parties came about in a friendly and peaceful manner 
and the allegation by the Complaining Witness of a transition into 
violence raised a genuine and critical issue as to her consent. 
Because the Trial Court excluded proffered evidence about the 
Complaining Witness's reputation and moral character the Supreme 
Court found that there may have been a different result had such 
-20-
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evidence been allowed at Trial. The Court stated the test for 
determining whether or not an error was prejudicial as follows: 
(I)f upon looking at the whole evidence it 
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that there is 
no substantial likelihood that the verdict would 
have been different in the absence of the error, 
it should be disregarded. But the reverse prop-
osition is also true: That if there is a reason-
able likelihood that in the absence of the error, 
there would have been a different result, the 
error should be regarded as prejudicial. (Emphasis 
added) 544 P.2d 468, 469. 
Had the Trial Court in the case at bar properly allowed 
evidence to impeach the testimony of the State's only witness as 
to the elements of the crime, there is a substantial likelihood 
that a different result would have been reached. Therefore the 
error by the Trial Court in excluding the impeachment evidence 
must be deemed to have been prejudicial, and the guilty verdict 
reversed. 
In State vs. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977), this Court· 
reversed the Defendant's conviction at Trial for Distribution for 
Value of a Controlled Substance. The Defendant had appealed his 
conviction on grounds that, amoung other things, the Prosecution 
had made oblique but impermissible references to the failure of 
the Defendant to testify in his own behalf. The Court stated: 
Consistant with the nature of criminal proceedings 
and the protections accorded those accused of crime 
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under our law, including the presumption of innocence 
and the burdon of the State to prove the Defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we believe that, on 
appeal, when there is a reasonable doubt as to whether 
the error below was prejudicial, that doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the Defendant. (Emphasis added) 
569 P.2d at 1116. 
In the instant case there is a reasonable likelihood that in 
the absence of the erroneous exclusion of impeachment evidence by 
the Trial Judge the Court would not have been able to arrive at a 
verdict of guilty. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the testimony of the State's Witness regarding the 
alleged elements of the crime consisted of hazy recollections 
during intermittent and brief periods of consciousness, reasonable 
minds could not believe beyond every reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant was guilty of the crime charged. The evidence presented 
in support of that allegation was simply insufficient as a matter 
of law. The Trial Court's action in excluding evidence which 
would further impeach the testimony of the State's Witness, 
artificially propped up and supported that testimony. Defendant's 
conviction resulted from an error committed by the Trial Court 
which prejudicially affected the Defendant's substantial rights. 
Therefore Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
the verdict of guilty rendered against him in the Court below. 
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